ABSTRACT Identifier network is one of promising network architectures to solve IP dual-property issues by separating network into access network and core network. The key design is the identifier/location separation mechanism which introduces user accessing address space and network routing address space to represent the identifier and location of terminal, respectively. The core network can prevent the cyber attacks by controlling the mapping relationship between Accessing IDentifier (AID) and Routing IDentifier (RID) via the mapping system. While the access network is facing serious security problems which makes it easily to be attacked. Therefore, this work focuses on access network security and studies AID shuffling mechanism by randomizing identifier through virtual AID. However, how the mapping servers allocate virtual AID to terminals in a reasonable way is quite difficult. To solve this problem, we propose an AID shuffling mechanism based on Group-buying Auction for Identifier Network (GAIN) among mapping servers, accessing switching routers and terminals. First, GAIN decides a group bid for each group leader and the winning virtual AID range for each group. Second, the mapping servers allocate the identifier for each terminal. Third, GAIN determines how much each winning group leaders should pay for virtual AID range to each mapping server in the winning group. We evaluate the identifier assignment of GAIN in terms of rationality, budget balance, computational tractability and truthfulness. The large-scale simulations are performed to evaluate GAIN, and the results are presented to verify the effectiveness and efficiency by comparing with other state-of-the-art approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The original design principle of Internet does not consider sufficient security mechanism for that the early running environment is credible and closed. While with the booming of Internet users and applications, lots of new application paradigms such as fog computing [1] , cloud computing, edge computing [2] are booming, and the issues such as security, mobility, privacy-preserving [3] , [4] are emerging. Lots of efforts are focusing on the future network architecture design [5] . Identifier Network (IN) is a promising future network architecture which can help to solve the different The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Nan Cheng.
kinds of original network design problems [6] - [9] . IN divides the network architecture into two layers which are infrastructure layer and pervasive service layer. The infrastructure layer of IN is divided into access network and core network, and access network introduces Accessing IDentifier (AID) to identify the massive terminals for upper layer services, and core network introduces Routing IDentifier (RID) to represent the location of terminals for routing. The addressing space separation of AID and RID decouples the dual-property of IP, which is benefit for the network scalability, security and mobility support. The pervasive service layer of IN consists of pervasive service layer and virtual connection layer, and introduces the Service IDentifier (SID) and Connection IDentifier (CID) to describe various services and connections, respectively. The separation of SID and CID decouples the resource and location binding which is benefit for the service quality and resource utilization. From the aspect of a typical application, an application represented by SID, is mapped into one or more CIDs to identify the service connections. The CID is then mapped into AIDs tuple to maintain the on-going sessions, and finally the AID is mapping into RID when the packets traverses core network. These design principles of IN can decouple the user/network binding, control/forwarding, and resource/location bindings [10] , which are beneficial to network security in terms of protecting the core network from outside attacks, protecting the location privacy of terminals, and providing the inherently access control over control plane such as mapping system. As a promising network architecture, IN has evolved to Smart Identifier Network (SINET) [11] , [12] and extended to apply in satellite-terrestrial networks [5] , vehicular communication [13] - [15] , and smart grid [16] .
By separating the access network and core network and introducing the identifier/location separation mechanism, IN can detect attacks such as DDoS [17] . In this case, the core part of IN can hardly be attacked, while the access part is still facing various kinds of attacks. As a result, one of moving target defend method, i.e. network address shuffling is proposed to solve this security issue [18] . Using network address shuffling mechanism, the access network can prevent attackers by periodically remapping AID. Figure 1 shows the basic architecture of identifier network and AID shuffling mechanism. The whole network can be divided into control plane and data plane logically, and the data plane can be further divided into access network and core network, which adopt the AID and RID, respectively. A terminal in an access network has one true AID and multiple virtual AIDs. The true AID is the only real identity of the terminal in access network, and all the sessions and upper layer applications of terminal are identified by true AID. Since the AID is unchanged during the service, IN can provide the authentication and mobility support easily. The virtual AID is a temporary identify of terminal, which is only useful for the data transmission among access network. The virtual AID is time varying and randomized changed.
The Accessing Switching Router (ASR) maintains the mapping relationship among true AID, virtual AIDs and RID for each terminal. When a terminal wants to transmit packets VOLUME 7, 2019 to a Corresponding Node (CN), it adopts the true AID to set up the session, while dynamically changes the using virtual AID during the session. The packets are encapsulated with terminal's virtual AID and CN's true AID. These packets will be transmitted to the attached ASR and re-encapsulated with terminal's RID and CN's RID. Once the packets arrive at the ASR that the CN attached, the packets will re-encapsulate with terminal's virtual AID and CN's true AID. During the packets transmission, the terminal randomly chooses a virtual AID from the its virtual AID range to prevent the attack reconnaissance. However, new problem is emerged, i.e. how to effective allocate the identifiers in a reasonable and efficient way.
To tackle this challenge, we propose an AID shuffling mechanism which is based on Group-buying Auction mechanism for Identifier Network security (GAIN) among mapping servers, accessing switching routers and terminals. GAIN is an extension of our previous work in [19] which focuses on the Wi-Fi Advertising. Different from the previous work, GAIN presents an artificial intelligence based method called three-stage auction mechanism for identifier allocation to promote the security of access network in identifier network. In this mechanism, the terminals in the same access network can be regarded as a group, and the accessing switching router can be seen as a group leader or bidder. Each group leader first decides a group bid and then the mapping servers allocate the identifier for each terminal, and finally GAIN determines the cost of each winning group leaders for virtual AID range to each mapping server in the winning group.
The contributions are summarized as follows. 1) We adopt the group-buying auction for virtual AID range assignment, which can solve the problem that single terminal cannot afford while the access network can. The group-buying auction allows the terminals in the same group to share the same virtual AID range which can improve the performance of AID shuffling under the given budget. 2) We propose AID shuffling mechanism based on GAIN to select proper group leaders and mapping servers in terms of rationality, budget balance, computational tractability and truthfulness. 3) We prove the performance of GAIN by simulations and show that GAIN can significantly improve the security of access network in terms of the utilities of mapping servers, accessing switching routers and terminals. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related work of network address shuffling and auction mechanisms. Section III introduces the system model and the formulates the virtual AID assignment problem. Section IV describes the proposed GAIN in detail. Section V gives the theoretical analysis results. Section VI presents the simulation results of GAIN. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Network address shuffling is an effective moving target defense strategy to mitigate the reconnaissance of cyber attacks by dynamically changing network addresses periodically, and it can prevent attackers acquiring potential victims' information. Lots of research efforts are focusing on its implementation [20] - [22] , theoretical model [18] , [23] - [31] and potential application scenarios [32] , [33] .
Dunlop et al. [20] implement a proof of concept Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) prototype on a live IPv6 network which shows that MT6D is valid and can achieve throughput and packet loss that results in negligible visible performance impact. Sherburne et al. [21] implement MT6D in 6LoWPAN with objective to provide a power-efficient MTD for WSN. Furthermore, some of them have produced MTD products. For example, aiming to dynamically change the appearance and behavior of enterprise network, Cryptonite launches Cryptonite NXT [34] to dynamics changing view of enterprise network over time and space, which can prevent the targeting, entering, or spreading procedure of cyber attacks [22] .
These network address shuffling implementations are mostly limited to specific scenarios. Besides these empirical results, some researches are focused on theoretical models. Evans et al. [23] propose a MTD model and analyze its performance under different attacks strategies to evaluate effectiveness of diversity defenses. Carroll et al. [18] develop a set of network address shuffling models under different network scenarios and analyze the attack effects under different network sizes, number of addresses and vulnerable systems. Zhang et al. [25] propose an analytical model for determining the effectiveness of MTD systems with objective to optimize the enterprise network design. To balance the security and cost of MTD deployment, Zaffarano et al. [26] present an quantitative framework for MTD effectiveness evaluation to guide MTD deployment decisions. Zhang et al. [27] model cyber attacks by considering the account overall system information, pre-and post-conditions. Maleki et al. [28] adopt Markov-model-based framework to model and analyze MTD strategies. Connell et al. [29] present a quantitative analytic model to assess the resource availability and MTD performance. More recently, Xiong et al. [30] extend the attack surface model and propose an effectiveness assessment model based on the offensive and defensive process to dynamically describe the MTD.
Identifier network security is derived from identifier/location separation mechanism, which can also benefit from MTD especially the network address shuffling. Our previous work are focused on RID shuffling, while little consider the AID shuffling. The previous researches show that the amount of network address space has an significant impact on the benefit of MTD. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of MTD, the AID space in access network should be increased. However, the increment of AID space will consume more resource and increase the system process cost. Therefore, in this paper, we mainly study the AID shuffling mechanism, and combine the auction mechanism and AID shuffling mechanism to make the efficient decision.
Auction mechanism as an efficient resource allocation mechanism has been widely applied in tangible and virtual goods selling including spectrum allocation [35] , [36] , crowd sensing [37] , Wi-Fi Advertising [19] and so on. In terms of spectrum auction, inspired by Internet group-buying services, Lin et al. [35] explore the group-buying behaviors of spectrum auction and propose a Three-stage Auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying (TASG). After that, Yang et al. [36] propose two truthful group buying auctions (TRUBA and TRUBA+) by maximizing the budget collected from the secondary users, to improve the performance of group-buying in terms of the number of successful transactions, the average number of winning secondary users in each secondary network, the average utility of secondary users, and the average utility of secondary access points compared with TASG. In terms of mobile crowd sensing, Huang et al. [37] present a Two-phase Group Buying based Auction (TGBA) mechanism by using the group buying behaviors of requesters. More recently, in terms of Wi-Fi Advertising, Liu et al. [19] proposes a Group-buying based Auction mechanism for Wi-Fi Advertising (GAWA) to promote the advertisers' advertisements under the limited budget. However, none of them apply the group-buying auction into network address shuffling. Therefore, in this paper, we present a new mechanism for AID shuffling based on group-buying auction for identifier network.
III. SYSTEM MODEL, PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GAIN FRAMEWORK
This section first introduces identifier network security application scenario, in which there are three types of entities are introduced, i.e., mapping servers, accessing switching routers, and terminals. And then, it formulates the interactions among them as a three-stage group-buying auction. Finally, it presents some desired properties. Figure 2 shows a typical application scenarios of identifier network which consists of multiple access networks, ASRs, and mapping servers. Each accessing network has an ASR which is responsible for managing the virtual AIDs of each attached terminal. The mapping server is in charge of virtual AIDs allocation. The more virtual AIDs means more shuffling opportunities and more defense cost. Table 1 shows the main notations used in this paper. Suppose that a set of mapping servers M is available to allocate virtual AIDs, and a set of terminal groups T in the access network is formed. In the ith accessing network, the group members are the set of terminals S i . We use t virtual AIDs allocation. Considering that a terminal usually cannot afford a whole virtual AID range for that it has limited bid b j i (k), we can get that v j i (k) r(k). Therefore, terminals in the same accessing network should form a group voluntarily and select a group leader as the bidder to bid the whole virtual AID range. In identifier network, the group leader is generally the ASR of the given access network.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we propose a group-buying based auction mechanism for virtual AIDs allocation in AID shuffling. In our auction mechanism, all bids are sealed-bids and there is no collusion before bidding. As shown in Figure 3 , the proposed auction mechanism consists of three stages.
In stage I, all terminals in the same group submit their bids to the group leader, i.e. the ASR of the given access network. The ASR determines the winner set from all terminals for all the mapping servers by comparing their group bids. At the same time, all groups will also perform the auctions among group members independently. For a given virtual AID range at mapping server all terminals, and decides the winning terminals set S * i and group bid b i (k) for m(k).
In stage II, group leader (i.e. ASR) l i submits group bids for the virtual AID range at which it intends to assign the virtual AIDs. The mapping server selects the winning group leader (i.e. ASR), and provides the service and is responsible for the charges. For the group leader (i.e. ASR) that fails to obtain a virtual AID range, there is no transactions and all the terminals set their utilities to zero. For the group leader (i.e. ASR) that obtains virtual AIDs, some terminals will be selected to form the winning terminal set S * i by considering their payments, and each terminal in set S * i will set a non-negative utility. For the rest of terminals, their utilities are set to zeros.
In stage III, if terminal t j i is in the winning terminal set S * i , t j i is charged p j i (k), which is based on group leader (i.e. ASR) l i ; otherwise, no charge on t j i .
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To simplify the problem analysis, we adopt average sharing mode such that each winning terminal in the group will get the same share. Therefore, the valuation of virtual AID range at mapping server m(k) obtained by terminal t j i can be formulated asv
For the given share of terminal in term of virtual AID range, we introduce the utility to evaluate the difference between valuation v j i (k) and payment p j i (k) of terminal t j i as following.
ASR (group leader) l i 's bid for mapping server m(k) is
Assume that each ASR can submit its bids for multiple mapping servers and win at least one mapping server, the utility of ASR l i can be defined as
where W is the set of winning ASRs. The utility of mapping server is defined as
where u k is the utility of the kth mapping server which is defined as
C. OBJECTIVES OF GAIN
In this part, we introduce some objectives we would like to achieve in this paper.
1) Individual Rationality
No bidder is in charge more than its bid which means the utilities of winning terminals and winning ASRs should be not less than zeros in this work.
2) Budget Balance
The total payment from bidders (terminals/ASR) are no less than the total income of mapping servers (seller). In this work, each winning ASR receives no less payment from its terminal of the group that amount it pays to the mapping servers.
3) Truthfulness
The truthfulness means that all bidders adopt dominant strategy to maximize its utility regardless of what others' strategies are.
4) Computation Efficiency
The computational complexity of auction algorithm is polynomial time. In this paper, we will evaluate GAIN to satisfy individual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness and computational efficiency.
IV. THE PROPOSED AUCTION MECHANISM
This section first describes the auction design goals, and then introduces the proposed Group-buying based Auction mechanism for Identifier Allocation (GAIN) in detail.
A. STAGE I: GROUP BID FOR ASR
The first stage is to calculate the group bid algorithm of each ASR, and then demonstrate its procedure by a simple example.
1) GROUP BID CALCULATION ALGORITHM FOR ASR
Obviously, to increase the winning probability in next stage auction, each ASR should calculate the bids from terminals of its group to maximize the whole group bid. Similar to [36] , assume that b is an decreasing ordered vector to present the bids from terminals of the ASR's group, the optimal profit of the payment for b, i. e. opt(b) can be expressed as follows.
where b i is the ith bid in b. From Eq. (7), we can observe that the maximization of group bid for ASR will lead to untruthful bidding from terminals from its group. To avoid this problem, we use randomized auction introduced in [38] which has been proved to be truthful.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the group bid calculation procedure of group leader l i (i.e. ASR) for the given virtual AID range at mapping server m(k). No one can win the auction if there is only one bid for virtual AID range at mapping server m(k). In other case, we can divide the bids of all the terminals into two sets by uniformly partitioning, i.e., put bid in b with probability 1/2 and otherwise in b . Both b and b are sorted in a decreasing order with ties broken arbitrarily.
Let denote the optimal single price profits for b and b with b and b * , respectively. For the given b * and b * , we compute the largest i and i to make that the i th and i th bidders' bids are at lease b * /i and b * /i , respectively. The potential winning group are selected from group with larger profit of the subset of terminals, and the payment for each terminal in that group is based on the less profit, in which we can prevent untruthfulness. The terminal will be removed from the potential winning group if the share of the virtual AID's valuation is less than the payment.
2) A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
This section will give a simple example to further illustrate the procedure of Algorithm 1. Let's assume that there are 6 terminals (t 1 , · · · , t 6 ) in the access network with virtual AID range bids and valuations, i.e., b (7), we have b i (k) = 189 and b i (k) = 186. Therefore, the terminals with b i (k) will be selected as the potential winning group whose group bid is b i (k). Naturally, the payment for each terminal in that group is p = 186 3 = 62. Finally, we get that the winning terminals are t 1 , t 3 , t 5 , and the payment for each winning terminal is 62.
Based on the above example, we evaluate the truthfulness of the auction which only aims to maximize the group bid. To do so, all the possible b and b are enumerated and calculated their corresponding group bids. Choosing the winner set The bids of all the terminals in access network g i for virtual AID range at m(k) form b; 3: if |b| ≤ 1 then 
S * i is the winning terminal set with b ;
15:
16:
18:
end if 20: end if 21: Remove j with v . In this case, t 5 keeps in the winning group and increases its utility by lying its bid. Therefore, the auction which only aims to maximize its group bid is untruthful.
B. STAGE II: VIRTUAL AID RANGE ASSIGNMENT FOR ASR
In stage I, each group leader (i.e. ASR) has calculated the group bid and the corresponding winning terminals for virtual AID range. However, any ASR does not know whether it can win an virtual AID range from the mapping server and which AID range it will obtain. This stage will describe how the auction is carried out between ASR and mapping servers. 
1) VIRTUAL AID RANGE DISTRIBUTING ALGORITHM FOR ASR
This algorithm first constructs a bipartite graph to denote relationship between ASR and mapping server. There will be an edge between an ASR and mapping server if the ASR maintains a group bid for the virtual AID range at that mapping server. Second, this algorithm adopts the methodology in [38] to get all maximum matchings in partite graph. More specifically, this algorithm sorts the mapping servers set M in an increasing order based on the reserved prices of virtual AID range with ties broken arbitrarily, and sorts winning ASRs set W in an decreasing order based on its group bids with with ties broken arbitrarily.
Assume that the largest number of trades is denoted by n which satisfies b n > r n . In case of n = 1, there is no trade. Otherwise, it will select top n − 1 ASRs as the potential winning ASRs and and the top n − 1 mapping servers as the active mapping servers, respectively. In this case, all the potential winning ASRs pay b n , and all the active mapping servers are paid r n . If the potential winning ASR's matching active virtual AID range is not in the set of active mapping servers, the potential winning ASR is removed from the set. Additionally, if the active mapping server's matching potential winning ASR is not in the potential winning ASR set, the active mapping server is removed from the set. Then we find the updated matchings if each of them has the largest number of remaining MS-ASR pairs. If there is only one matching, the final winning ASR and active mapping servers are derived from the matching, otherwise they are obtained from the matching with the largest utility.
2) A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
This section gives a simple example to show how Algorithm 2 works. As shown in Fig. 3 , there is a set of virtual AID range at mapping servers M = {m 1 Sort W in decreasing order of group bids of ASRs according to M i to obtain W = (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w j ), with ties broken arbitrarily; 6: n = argmax b n > r n ; 7: if n = 1 then 8:
else 10:
11:
12:
13:
end if 15: for i = 1 to n − 1 do 16: if v i 's matching bid / ∈ W * then 17:
end if 19: end for 20: for i = 1 to n − 1 do 21: if b i 's matching virtual AID range at mapping servers / ∈ M * then 22:
end if 24: end for 25: Update M i according to M * and W * ; 26: end for 27: Find the updated matchings with the largest number of MS-ASR pairs, e.g., 
C. STAGE III: TERMINAL PRICING
Based on the operations of stage I and stage II, the mapping server has assigned virtual AID ranges to ASR. In stage III, each winning ASR is responsible for distributing the virtual AID range to the winning terminals and charging them based on the strategy generated in stage I. Considering that the adoption of discriminatory share may result in that terminal increases its utility by increasing its bid, all the winning terminals share the assigned virtual AID range in an even way.
Take the previous example of Algorithm 1 as an example, the winning terminal set is {t 1 , t 3 , t 5 }, and their payment to get the virtual AID range is 62. All the winning terminals share the virtual AID range in an even way, and the shared valuations for terminals {t 1 , t 3 
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the GAIN in terms of individual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness and time complexity.
Theorem 1: GAIN is individual rational for each terminal in a winning accessing network and each winning ASR.
proof 1: To prove the individual rationality of each terminal in a winning accessing network, we assume that if B ≤ B , p = B /j , where j = argmax j ∈[1,|b |] j b j ≥ B , b and b are sorted in descending order. We get j b j ≥ B = j p. Therefore, b ≥ p for all the winning terminals. We can find the same result if B > B . Therefore, GAIN mechanism satisfies individual rationality for each terminal in a winning accessing network.
To prove that each winning access router is individual rational. Based on line 13 in Algorithm 2, p g i = b n , ∀i ∈ W . Because B g is sorted in increasing order of group bids of ASRs according to M i to obtain W = (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w n ), with ties broken arbitrarily; k = argmax v k > b k , we have v k > b k . Therefore, GAIN mechanism satisfies individual rationality for each winning ASR.
Theorem 2: GAIN is budget balanced. Proof 2: Based on the line 6, line 12 and line 13 in Algorithm 2, we can find that for each MS-ASR pair in each updated matching, the payment of the virtual AID range is not less than the one of the paired bid. Therefore, we have M b n − r n ≥ 0. Hence GAIN mechanism satisfies budget balance.
Theorem 3: GAIN is truthful for terminals. As for Algorithm 2, the time complexity consists of the following parts. First, the time complexity of finding a maximum matching is O(|M |) [38] , thus finding maximum matchings is bounded by O(m|M |). Second, the time complexity of outer for loop is O(m) for that it takes m iterations. Third, for each iteration of the outer for loop, the computation efficiency is dominated by the sorting step (Lines 5 and 6), which is bounded by |M |log|M |. Hence the total time complexity is bounded by O(m|M |log|M |).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, based on the proposed algorithms we present numerical results to show that GAIN can significantly To evaluate the performance of the GAIN algorithm, we consider several metrics including the number of successful transactions, the average utility of accessing switching routers, the number of winning terminals and the average utility of terminals. Several state-of-the-art algorithms, i.e., TASG [35] , TGBA [37] and TRUBA + [36] are compared to prove the effectiveness of GAIN.
• TASG [35] : A three-stage auction framework for spectrum group-buying, a novel winner determination algorithm is designed to conduct the auction between group leaders and the spectrum holder.
• TGBA [37] : A two-phase group buying based auction mechanism, an efficient randomized matching algorithm is designed to allocate sellers to each group and determine rewards for winning members.
• TRUBA + [36] : A truthful group buying auction, random matching and lowest big higher than reserve price as payment. In order to get the average numerical results, we calculate 600 times for the above algorithms. Figure 4 shows the number of successful transactions of the above algorithms increases, with the increase of the number of terminals. It is because that with the increase of the number of terminals, the group bid increases and results in that more ASRs hold group bids which are larger than the reserved prices of virtual AID range. And GAIN achieves the largest number of successful transactions. It indicates that using our algorithm mapping servers can allocate the virtual AID range to the ASRs much more effectively. As a result, the terminals in the accessing network will get more virtual AID range for network address shuffling. Figure 5 shows the number of winning terminals under different number of terminals. We can get that TGBA achieves the largest number of winning terminals than the others, and the increase of the number of terminals has less impact on the number of winning terminals for TASG, TRUA+ and GAIN than TGBA. It is because that the winning terminals are obtained by sacrificing terminals, while each terminal in TGBA with lower payment than its bid and the valuation is selected as a winning terminal, resulting in more winning terminals than those in the other algorithms, thus more successful transactions and winning groups.
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 6 , the average utility of accessing switching router (i.e. ASR) in TGBA is much larger than that in other algorithms when the number of terminals is more than 70. It is because that with the increase of the number of terminals, the number of winning terminals in TGBA algorithm is much larger than that in other algorithms. However, in our application scenario, the utility of mapping servers is an important metric to evaluate the security performance of identified network, which will be shown in Figure 8 .
As shown in Figure 7 , with the increase of the number of terminals, the average utility of terminal of all algorithms decreases. It is because that the valuation of each virtual AID range allocated by mapping servers is a constant value. When the number of terminals increases, the shared valuation of each terminals will decrease, resulting in decreased average utility of each winning terminals. Although in TGBA algorithm both the number winning terminals and average utility of ASR (access routers) are much larger than those in other algorithms, we can find that the average utility of mapping server in TGBA algorithm is much less than that in other algorithms as shown in Figure 8 . To be more specific, the utility of mapping servers in GAIN algorithm is much larger than TGBA by two orders of magnitude (ranging from 14.5 to 240.5 times), which indicates that GAIN outperforms significantly than TGBA. Note that the number of successful transactions in GAIN algorithm is largest than the other algorithms for that GAIN algorithm is aiming to maximize the utility of mapping servers.
The above analytical results show that GAIN archives largest number of successful transactions utility of mapping server, and more winning terminals than TASG and TRUBA+, and larger average of utility of terminal than TGBA and TASG.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the security issues in identifier network and found the network address shuffling is an effective way to improve the security of access network. And then, we have integrated group-buying into identifier allocation, and proposed an artificial intelligence based method called GAIN. The obtain numerical results shows that GAIN can significantly increase the utilities of mapping servers, ASRs and terminals. The proposed mechanism can obtain the optimized solution with lowest computation complexity and achieve the largest number of successful transaction, while guaranteeing the properties such as individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. The analysis results indicate that GAIN can effectively solve the problem of dynamic identifier allocation in access network.
